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Abstract
If one is interested in reasoning counterfactually within a physical theory, one cannot ad-
equately use the standard possible world semantics. As developed by Lewis and others, this
semantics depends on entertaining possible worlds with miracles, worlds in which laws of
nature, as described by physical theory, are violated. Van Fraassen suggested instead to use
the models of a theory as worlds, but gave up on determining the needed comparative sim-
ilarity relation for the semantics objectively. I present a third way, in which this similarity
relation is determined from properties of the models contextually relevant to the truth of the
counterfactual under evaluation. After illustrating this with a simple example from thermody-
namics, I draw some implications for future work, including a renewed possibility for a viable
deflationary account of laws of nature.
1 Introduction: The Importance of Counterfactual Reasoning
Reasoning with physical theories is replete with modal and, especially, counterfactal conditionals
and inferences therewith. For example, Newtonian gravitation seems to warrant the claim that
“if two bodies have different masses, and if they were brought near a third body in turn, they
would exhibit different acceleration” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 60). Competent users of the theory
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Dubrovnik, Istanbul, Helsinki, Munich, Floriano´polis, Ames (at Iowa State), Minneapolis, and (under the present
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endorse this conditional even if no masses were so brought. Moreover, they also ground claims for
intervention and control:
Suppose the actual length of the pendulum on my grandfather clock is L. The model
permits us to calculate the period, T. It also permits us to calculate a slightly greater
period T’ corresponding to a slightly greater length L’. Suppose the clock is running
slightly fast. I claim that turning adjusting screw one turn counterclockwise would
increase the length of the pendulum to L’, and this would increase the period to T’, so
that the clock would run slightly slower. (Giere, 1999, p. 96)
Although the example is simple, it exemplifies a pattern of reasoning that underlies most, if not all,
successful applications of classical physics to applied problems and engineering tasks.
Such reasoning extends to modern physics as well, illuminating, for example, the role that
the global phase of a quantum state plays in how (non-relativistic) quantum theory specifies its
observables:
If in one possible world, an isolated system is in state ψ and in another it is in state
[−ψ], no amount of empirical information actually available can tell the observer
which of these two worlds he is in. But . . .if the system had interacted with another
one in such and such a way, the results would have been different in the two cases.
(van Fraassen, 1980, p. 62)
According to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum theory, one represents a
measurement on a system with a binary (“yes”/“no”) outcome as a projection operator P on the
quantum state space, so that the probability of a positive outcome is given by |Pψ|2—this is the so-
called Born rule. Different global phases (such the factor of +1 or −1 described above) yield the
same probability. But they also yield different patterns of constructive and destructive interference
when the system interacts with another, or even with itself! Indeed, this latter case is the basis of
the famously astounding double-slit inference experiments. Thus for both classical and modern
physical theories, counterfactual claims underlie the observable, not merely observed, predictions
of the theory.
Philosophers of science, meanwhile, have often taken patterns of counterfactual reasoning us-
ing a scientific theory as central to a proper understanding of how scientific theories explain (Wood-
ward, 2017), leading possibly through the definition of natural laws (Carroll, 2016) and causation
(Menzies, 2017) to the application of induction and the confirmation of theories (Goodman, 1983,
Ch. 3) and definition of determinism (Earman, 1986). The standard semantics for counterfactuals,
known as variably strict conditionals, can be given in terms of a comparative similarity relation
amongst possible worlds, and was developed (in various essentially equivalent versions) by Stal-
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naker (1968), Lewis (1973, 1981), and Kratzer (1981), But these semantics pose, however, at least
two interconnected problems for their application to physical phenomena.
First, there is the issue of the scope of the worlds themselves. Although there is debate about
how to understand the nature of possible worlds (Menzel, 2017), the real problem here is that,
whatever their nature, metaphysically possible worlds generally outstrip those nomically allowed
by a physical theory. If there are possibilia incompatible with those that a physical theory of
interest permits, yet those possibilia are the ones used to provide a semantics for counterfactual
reasoning using the theory, in what sense is one really using the theory for reasoning? How does
the theory constrain that reasoning at all?
In the same works quoted above, van Fraassen and Giere proposed a solution strategy to this
problem: replace the use of possible worlds in the semantics with models of the theory being used.
For instance, van Fraassen (1980, p. 199) advises that “If language use is guided by an accepted
scientific theory, then we must look to that theory in order to construct models of the language
in use,” enjoining us to try to “characterize (fragments of) scientific language by means of the
concepts of formal semantics but in such a way that the model structures derive in an obvious way
from the models of scientific theories.” For example, “if I say that it is impossible to observe a
muon directly, or to melt gold at room temperature, this is because no counterpart to such events
can be found in any model of the science I accept” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 218). Put another
way, the original goal of the semantics for counterfactuals was to model their meaning in natural
language, which may not be sufficiently regimented in comparison with scientific reasoning that
uses them. By restricting attention to this more limited goal—i.e., implicitly prefacing reasoning
with, “According to physical theory T ,”—one can properly solve this first problem.1
Modal and counterfactual reasoning using these models then warrants conclusions about the
world in virtue of the models’ successful representational features. This is one of the basic fea-
ture of representational modeling, to facilitate surrogative reasoning. Indeed, van Fraassen (1989,
p. 214) writes that “reference or denotation is gained indirectly because certain parts of the model
may correspond to elements of reality. The exploration of modal discourse may then draw largely
on structure in the models, which outstrips their representation of reality.” For him, successful
representation is a matter of isomorphism between the empirical (sub-)structure of a theory and
appearances (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 64), while Giere (1999, p. 95) states that “here ‘success-
ful representation’ does not imply an exact fit, but at most a fit within the limits of what can be
detected using existing experimental techniques.” Now, van Fraassen and Giere disagree about
1This prefacing also allows one to separate the question of counterfactual reasoning within a theory from the
question of its acceptance, and what that entails, contrary to what the above quotation from van Fraassen suggests.
Moreover, it is neutral between the indicative and subjunctive readings because the semantics I propose is independent
of the empirical (or metaphysical) adequacy of the theories whose models are employed. See also my discussion of
Boyle in Section 6.
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whether such reasoning warrants evidence in the reality of the possibilia (beyond their observable
features) that a class of scientific models represents, but for present purposes, one can hold the
realism debate in abeyance.
But there is a second problem that the standard semantics for counterfactual reasoning faces,
one concerning the comparative similarity relation. Formally, this is a three-place relation j ≤i k
among worlds i, j, k that are accessible from i, interpreted as “ j is at least as similar to world i as
world k.” One requires that it satisfy the following properties:2
Quasi-Reflexive For all j, if there is some k such that either j ≤i k or k ≤i j, then j ≤i j.
Transitive For all j, k, l, if j ≤i k and k ≤i l, then j ≤i l.
Quasi-reflexivity requires that any world deemed comparatively similar to another is always at
least as similar as itself is to that other. Transitivity just requires that comparative similarity orders
its elements in the expected way.
These formal properties are not nearly stringent enough to determine a unique comparative
similarity relation, which is needed to evaluate the truth of counterfactuals. So how is one to
determine this? Lewis (1986a, pp. 47–8) famously suggested the following ranked desiderata:
1. It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law.
2. It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect
match of particular fact prevails.
3. It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple violations of law.
4. It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in
matters that concern us greatly.
These desiderata have at least four undesirable features for present purposes. First, they are un-
helpfully vague. Perhaps this vagueness is appropriate for a semantics concerned with reasoning
in natural language, but one wonders whether one can achieve something more precise with reg-
imented scientific reasoning, if only because it is a narrowed and more regimented domain of
discourse. Second, the desiderata depend on an account of natural law—Lewis has in mind his
own “systems” account—but debates about laws abound (Carroll, 2016). A sophisticated and sci-
entifically sensitive account of natural law may be apt here, but consensus on what this could be
seems distant. Third, even provided such an account, the ranking depends on the countenance of
possible worlds containing “miracles”—violations of scientific law—which recapitulates the first
2Here I use requirements equivalent to those of Lewis (1981); previously, Lewis (1973) has required ≤i to be a
total preorder on all worlds.
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problem for the application of the standard semantics. Stated in the present terms, this was the
seeming incompatibility of reasoning within a scientific theory while countenancing states of af-
fairs that the theory forbids. If one solves this by restricting attention to models of the theory under
consideration as proposed, however, the first and third desiderata are moot. Fourth, the second
desideratum references spatio-temporal regions, but not all physical theories have models that rep-
resent spatio-temporal features—for example, models of thermodynamic systems at equilibrium.
This is where the present essay aims to contribute. Instead of trying to amend these problem-
atic features, I abandon Lewis’s suggestion for a new way of determining a comparative similarity
relation on a set of models representing a physical theory. In particular, I propose in Section 4–5
to encode the similarity of models through the similarity of their contextually relevant properties,
which provides a structured model of the logic VWU (or VCU, as described there). In particular, I
give an account of contextual relevance for a given counterfactual and how the properties (through
the formal device of semi-pseudometrics) so relevant determine the comparative similarity of mod-
els. This overcomes the problems with Lewis’s account while making essentially no substantive
assumptions about scientific realism or the metaphysics of laws of nature. Indeed, no assumptions
about the existence of laws is needed.3 This shows that, contrary to widespread belief, an account
of physical law is not indispensable for counterfactual reasoning in physics.
Part of what makes this possible is an important difference in goals from those mentioned
working on natural laws: instead of formally reconstructing the grounds for or “saving the phe-
nomena” of intuitive judgments of the truth of counterfactual statements in physics and the validity
of patterns of reasoning using them, I aim to reform and make precise those informal judgments
more systematically.4 The goal is to facilitate precise counterfactual reasoning with theories for
which our intuitions are indefinite or muddled, rather than show how we could have the intuitive
judgments that we do. In other words, it is Carnapian explication rather than non-transformative
conceptual analysis.
To further motivate my account, I consider and criticize beforehand (in Section 2) a different
proposal to understand counterfactuals in science as simpler strict conditionals (Muller, 2005)
before introducing the variably strict ones (in Section 3).5 Then, to illustrate, I compare my account
(in Section 6) with one due to Maudlin (2007) that is at first glance unrelated, showing how mine
3No assumptions about the metaphysical possibility of the states of affairs represented by the counterfactual an-
tecedent are needed, either. Such a counterfactual will not be vacuous if its antecedent is true in some model. So, the
present approach is viable for those who take some aspects of scientific reasoning to involve (metaphysical) counter-
possibilities (Jenny, 2018; Tan, 2018).
4Indeed, data from Ciardelli et al. (2018) indicate that at least the general populace does not make counterfactual
judgments in accordance with any version of ordering semantics at all. They tended to use simple everyday language
counterfactuals, however, so there is still room for the present reforming project when it comes to counterfactuals in
physics.
5Actually, Muller (2005) slightly modifies the strict conditional to change how it rules in cases of impossible
antecedents, but this makes no difference to the point at issue.
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in fact encompasses and extends it. Then I apply this semantics to a few simple examples from
elementary equilibrium thermodynamics in Section 7. My goal is to provide evidence that my
proposal not only makes contact with science, but is ineffectual without and inextricable from it.
Finally, I outline in the concluding Section 8 some suggestions and challenges for extending the
present ideas to other (non-physical) scientific theories and models, and to probabilistic models,
as well as directions for further research regarding the logic described and its implications for the
status of laws of nature within the metaphysics of science.
2 The Poverty of Strict Conditionals
The idea to develop a formal semantics using models of theories as substitutes for possible worlds
is not entirely new. In order to further develop the concept of observability for constructive empiri-
cism in response to criticism by Ladyman (2000), Muller (2005, p. 70) states that, among others,
his own
major aim is to provide a rigorous account of modal language in science, notably
including subjunctive conditionals, without relying on Modal Realism, without even
mentioning fictional worlds, and staying within the confines of the semantic view on
scientific theories.
Muller proposes to use the standard relational semantics for modal languages, provided by a frame
(W,R), where W is a set (of “nodes,” often—but not necessarily—interpreted as possible worlds,)
and R is a binary relation (of “accessibility”) on W. The elements of the set in this case simply
the models of a theory, or a subclass thereof, and the definitions of the logical connectives and the
modal operators is standard; regarding the latter, for any sentence φ of the theory, with Boolean
valuation vφ : W → {>,⊥}, ^φ is true at i ∈ W just when there is some j ∈ W such that iR j and
vφ( j) = >. In other words, ^φ is true at i just when φ is true at some j ∈ W accessible from i; in
fact, this gives an interpretation of the accessibility relation in terms of relative possibility. This is
the “possibility” operator: “^φ” is interpreted as “it is possible that φ (in the models W).” Muller
(2005, p. 92) then defines
Necessity φ↔ ¬^¬φ,
Subj. Conditional (φ ψ)↔ ((φ→ ψ) ∧ ^φ).
The definition of the modal necessity operator is standard; the second conjunct in the definition
of the subjunctive conditional, ^φ, makes counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents
false rather than, as they would be without it, true, but what’s important for present purposes is
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Figure 1: The models accessible from i are depicted as the interior of the circle S . Those models
in which φ and ψ are true are depicted by the interiors of the regions with the respectively labeled
curved boundaries. The gray region indicates all those models in which φ is true which are also
accessible from i. Because this region lies entirely within the set of models accessible from i in
which ψ is true, the strict conditional (φ→ ψ) is true at i. (This figure is after Figure 1C of Lewis
(1973, p. 6).)
the first conjunct, (φ → ψ). This sentence, known as a strict conditional, is true at i just when
the material conditional φ → ψ is true at all j accessible from i. See, for example, Figure 1 for a
diagrammatic illustration.
What about the accessibility relation that the semantics requires? Here, Muller (2005, p. 94)
writes that,
Generally speaking, we should and we can pick and choose a relevant accessibility
relation at the level of the theory (all models), at the level of a sub-theory (a subset
of models of T), or at the level of a single model. Not anything is possible, however,
because the language of scientists in use puts constraints on what we can sensibly
define. That use of language should be our guide in defining accessibility relations
sensibly when we want to make sense of science.
So, different collections of models may have different accessibility relations, but those relations
should be fixed once and for all so as to fit best what scientists seem to assert.
There are at least two problems for this proposal for present purposes. First, the interpretation
of the accessibility relation as a notion of relative possibility seems to make its determination
entirely dependent on the interpretation of and assent to given particular sentences from scientists.
While that can be a noble goal in itself, it is not the present one, as I described in Section 1,
which is to provide a formal framework that can be used to facilitate counterfactual reasoning—its
title ought not be “Saving the Linguistic Phenomena” (Muller, 2005, p. 94) but rather “Rational
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Reconstruction” to build a formal apparatus that, as a tool for reasoning, allows one to reason in
complex situations where language proficiency is no guarantee of correctness.
The second, more general problem arises from the insistence on using the strict conditional
in the definition of the subjunctive (hence, counterfactual) conditional, one that is in fact already
well known. The nub is that the strict conditional satisfies the law of implicative weakening, i.e,
whenever (φ→ ψ) is true at i, so is ((φ ∧ φ′)→ ψ) for any φ′. (This is also known at the law of
antecedent strengthening.) This is just because the set of models for which φ∧ φ′ holds is a subset
of those for which φ holds, so the former models that are accessible from i are a subset of the latter
models that are accessible from i.
While this a welcome feature in, e.g., the material conditional, it will not do for the subjunctive.
Consider, as a toy example, a radioactive atom surrounded by sensitive radiation detectors, for
which we would like to affirm that radiation would be detected if the atom were to decay, but not
so if the atom were also in a lead box. No frame makes both of these statements true at any model.
To see this, consider the following symbolization key:
φ: The atom decays.
φ′: The atom is in a lead box.
ψ: Radiation is detected.
One would like to exhibit a frame that makes (φ → ψ) and ((φ ∧ φ′) → ¬ψ) true. However,
because the strict conditional satisfies the law of weakening, whenever (φ → ψ) is made true at
a model, the sentence ((φ ∧ φ′) → ψ) is made true at that model, too. Since the truth of this
sentence just means that all the accessible φ ∧ φ′ models are also ψ models, none of them are ¬ψ
models. Thus, any frame that makes (φ → ψ) true at a model makes ((φ ∧ φ′) → ¬ψ) false
at that model.6 The fact that Muller allows for different accessibility relations when restricting
attention to different sets of models does not help, for the set of models being considered—some
crude caricature of the early radiation theory, say—is fixed in the vignette.
3 The Viability of Variably Strict Conditionals
The most important problem for strict conditionals—their general satisfaction of the law of im-
plicative weakening, as discussed at the end of Section 2—is well known. Indeed, van Fraassen
(1980, pp. 114–7) himself has been skeptical of an analysis of counterfactuals using the strict con-
6See also Lewis (1973, Sect. 1.2) for further discussion of the problems that strict conditionals face as an explication
of natural language counterfactual conditionals.
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ditional for the same reasons.7 He also endorses the solution by Lewis and others adumbrated in
Section 1.
In a bit more detail:8 Given a comparative similarity relation ≤i on models W, as described in
Section 1,
φ ψ is true at i ∈ W (relative to ≤i) if and only if for every φ-model h comparable
to i by ≤i, there is some model j such that both
1. j ≤i h and
2. every φ-model k such that k ≤i j is also a ψ-model.
In other words, for every accessible model h in which the antecedent holds, there is another model,
j, at least as similar to i as h, such that all models k at least as similar to i as j are also models in
which the consequent holds. Informally, one could gloss this as the condition that the counterfac-
tual conditional is true at a model when in all sufficiently similar models in which the antecedent
holds, the consequent holds, too.
These semantics are called “variably strict” because they are similar to those of the strict con-
ditional, except the scope of the models considered is not fixed solely by the accessibility relation;
rather, this scope varies by the nature of the antecedent, expanding or contracting according to the
comparative similarity relation so as to find (or fail to find) the model j as described in the above
definition. This variable scope precludes the variably strict conditional from satisfying the law of
implicative weakening in general. For, it is no longer the case that scope of the models in which
φ holds is a superset of those in which φ ∧ φ′ hold, when these are considered as antecedents to
the conditional evaluated at i: the scope for the latter expands from just those sufficiently similar
φ-models to i to the sufficiently similar (φ ∧ φ′)-models to i. Indeed, it is simple to illustrate—
see Figure 2—how this works for the case described in Section 2 to make both φ  ψ and
(φ ∧ φ′)  ¬ψ true at a model.
Despite this success, van Fraassen (1980, p. 118) went on to conclude that it showed that
“science does not imply the truth of any counterfactual” (except in special trivial cases). First,
he noted the contextuality of the comparative similarity relation: depending on the context of
assertion, certain properties are held fixed and others let to be variable. Which are so held fixed in
general makes a difference to the truth value of a counterfactual conditional. Second, he observes
that “Science does not imply that the context is one way or another” (van Fraassen, 1980, p. 118)
7See also van Fraassen (1989, pp. 33–5).
8Here I follow Lewis (1981), who gives a modified semantics compared with Lewis (1973, p. 49), allowing the
comparative similarity relation to be merely partial. Swanson (2011) then presents a further sophistication based on
the concept of a cutset, but I’ve suppressed this innovation since it doesn’t make a significant difference for present
purposes.
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Figure 2: In this diagram, points represent models of W for which an accessibility relation R and a
comparative similarity relation ≤i are assumed, the latter assumed for simplicity of illustration to
be total on the models accessible from i. The accessible models at least as similar to i as to j and
j′ are, respectively, S = {k ∈ W : k ≤i j} and S ′ = {k ∈ W : k ≤i j′}. Those models in which
φ, φ′ and ψ are true are depicted by the interiors of the respectively labeled regions with curved
boundaries. The gray region in S indicates the subset of its models in which φ is true. Since these
are all models at which ψ is true, φ ψ is true. The other gray region indicates the subset of the
models of S ′ in which φ∧φ′ is true. Since these are all models at which ψ is false, (φ∧φ′)  ¬ψ
is true. (This figure is after Figure 2 of Lewis (1973, p. 11), with some modifications.)
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so “scientific propositions are not context-dependent in any essential way” (van Fraassen, 1980,
p. 118). Together these imply the aforementioned conclusion, hence the non-objectivity of modal
claims (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 35–6). This is just a version of the second major problem for
counterfactual reasoning in science described in Section 1, for which Lewis’s proposal described
there will not do.
But Muller (2005, p. 90) has already responded that this conclusion follows only because van
Fraassen has taken
context-independence as a necessary condition for objectivity . . .. We shall demon-
strate that ‘context’ can be replaced with a model or a subset of models of an accepted
theory, or with an accepted theory, which has little if anything to do with a loss of
objectivity—on the contrary.
Recall from Section 1 that Muller sought to interpret counterfactual conditionals as strict condi-
tionals (more or less), with the models and accessibility relations for the relational frames used
in the conditionals’ semantics determined by the theory or theory fragment chosen. If successful,
this would have blocked the argument against objectivity,9 and given scientific theories a claim to
imply the truth of some counterfactual conditionals, all by denying van Fraassen’s second premise
that science does not determine context—in particular, without adopting any assumptions about
laws of nature. But, as I argued there, Muller’s proposal founders on the usual formal problems
that the strict conditional faces, such as its undesirable satisfaction of the law of implicative weak-
ening. This problem motivated interpreting counterfactuals as variably strict conditionals instead,
but I shall argue that one can still implement Muller’s general strategy of determining the context
for variably strict conditionals without adding anything to the scientific theory used. This shall be
the goal of the next Section.
4 Similar Models through Similar Properties
Since instead of possible worlds I have already resolved to relativize the nodes of the formal seman-
tics to be the models of a particular physical theory, what remains of the “context” of evaluation of
a counterfactual conditional, construed as a variably strict conditional, is the comparative similar-
ity relation on the models. In this Section, I describe the formal apparatus regarding properties of
models that constructs this relation, then, in Section 5 how that apparatus is determined from a set
of those properties minimally relevant to the truth value of a counterfactual under consideration.
9Because context-independence is here taken only as a necessary condition for objectivity, blocking the argument
by itself does not entail that counterfactual conditionals are objective.
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Recall that the models W of a theory represent different states of affairs within the descriptive
scope of the theory. In particular, each ascribes some definite properties to what they represent, and
each such property can be represented by a valuation function. Given a property P, the valuation
vP : W → V assigns to each model a value in the valuation space V; for qualitative properties this
is simply {>,⊥} while for quantitative properties this may be the real line or a subset thereof. In
any case, this valuation space is often equipped with additional structure. Of particular interest
here is when that structure includes a semi-pseudometric:
Definition A semi-pseudometric on a space X is a function d : X × X → [0,∞) satisfying the
following conditions for all x, y ∈ X:
1. d(x, x) = 0, and
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x).
A semi-pseudometric is like a typical distance (“metric”) function, but more general in two ways.
The first condition above states that the distance between a point and itself is always the minimum:
zero. This is more general than a typical distance function (and what garners the “pseudo” moniker)
because it allows non-identical points to be assigned zero by the function. The second condition,
the same as a distance function, states it is a symmetric function. What’s missing (and what
garners the “semi” moniker) is the requirement that it satisfy the well-known triangle inequality,
that d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X. Of course, many semi-pseudometrics of interest
are pseudometrics, semi-metrics, or metrics, but for present purposes these properties need not be
assumed.
Here are three simple examples of semi-pseudometics for properties of models:
Qualitative Property Consider a generic qualitative property Q, so that vQ : W → {>,⊥}. A
natural metric, hence semi-pseudometric, on its valuation space is the identity function:
dQ(x, y) =
0 if x = y,1 if x , y. (1)
Percentage Composition Suppose that the models are of boxes of gas of various compositions,
and that A is the fraction of argon by volume. Then vA : W → [0, 1] and one natural
pseudometric, hence semi-pseudometric, on its valuation space is
dA(x, y) = |x − y|. (2)
This satisfies the triangle inequality but different samples of gas with the same fraction of
argon by volume would be assigned a distance of zero, so it is a pseudometric.
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Lorentzian Distance Suppose that the models are of Minkowski spacetime with two arbitrary
points distinguished, and that D is the geodesic distance between those points. Then vD :
W → [0,∞), and one natural semi-pseudometric on its valuation space is
dD(x, y) = |x − y|. (3)
If the distinguished points are null-related, the distance between them is zero, even if they
are distinct. Since distinct timelike-related points in Minkowski spacetime are each null-
related to a common point, the triangle inequality fails in general, and dD is only a semi-
pseudometric.
Consider now any property P of models in W with valuation vP whose valuation space V is
equipped with a semi-pseudometric dVP : V × V → [0,∞). dVP induces another semi-pseudometric
dWP on W as follows:
dWP (x, y) = d
V
P (vP(x), vP(y)). (4)
Thus a collection of properties P of models in W with corresponding set of valuationsVP induces
a set of semi-pseudometricsDPW on W. Such a set in turn determines a three-place relation j ≤i k
for i, j, k ∈ W as follows:
j ≤i k ↔ ∀dWP ∈ DPW , dWP (i, j) ≤ dWP (i, k). (5)
The relation thus defined satisfies the constrains of a comparative similarity relation, described in
Section 1, when the accessibility relation on models is taken to be the universal relation—i.e., all
models are accessible from all others. According to it, j is at least as similar to i as k if and only if
the differences between the relevant property valuations vWP of i and j are each no larger than those
between i and k.
Because any comparative similarity relation is a model for Lewis’s basic variably strict logic
of counterfactual conditionals V, this demonstrates that natural or widely agreed-upon distances
(from semi-pseudometrics) on the valuations spaces for a collection of properties of a set of models
determine the truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals using those models as nodes. (In fact,
the more general similarity structure on models, which is related formally to topological structure,
determines these truth conditions (Fletcher, 2019, §6.1), but that level of generality is not needed
for present purposes.)
A bit more can be said, however. Stating the main semantic result of this section requires one
more definition:
Definition A collection of semi-pseudometrics D on a set X is said to be separating when, for
each x, y ∈ X, there is some d ∈ D such that d(x, y) = 0 implies x = y.
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Furthermore, we may say that a collection of properties on models of W whose valuations have
valuation spaces equipped with semi-pseudometrics is separating when its induced collection of
semi-pseudometrics on W is separating. Separating collections of properties on a set of models
are just those that allow one to distinguish one model from another solely from their distances
according to at least one semi-pseudometric induced from a property.
Gathering the previous facts proves the following:
Theorem Each space equipped by a (separating) collection of semi-pseudometrics induces a com-
parative similarity relation on that space that makes it a model for the logic VWU (VCU).
For, among the V-logics:
• The U-logics are exactly those with universal accessibility relations.
• The W-logics are exactly those whose models have their comparative similarity relation
satisfying i ≤i j for all nodes i, j ∈ W.
• The C-logics are exactly those whose models have their comparative similarity relation such
that, for all nodes i, j ∈ W, if j ≤i i then i = j.
These are said to satisfy uniformity, weak centering, and centering, respectively (Lewis, 1973,
p. 120). Thus the above theorem follows immediately from the definition of the semi-pseudometrics
and their induced comparative similarity relation on a space. Notably, both VWU and VCU are
among the four logics that Lewis (1973, p. 130) primarily endorses for counterfactual conditionals
(although he ranks VC highest among them).
Although I have been focusing on semantic structures for logics for counterfactual reasoning, it
make help to recall the syntactic characterization of the logics VWU (VCU). Let φ, ψ, χ (possibly
with subscripts) denote sentences formed by the usual recursive compounding of sentence letters,
sentential constants > and ⊥, logical connectives, and the modal operators ,,^. Then the
logics in question have the following inference rules (Lewis, 1973, p. 132):
1. Modus Ponens;
2. “Deduction within Conditionals”: for any n ≥ 1,
` (χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn)→ ψ
` ((φ χ1) ∧ · · · ∧ (φ χn))→ (φ ψ) ;
3. and Interchange of Logical Equivalents.
They also have the following axioms (or really, axiom schemata), to be explained presently (Lewis,
1973, pp. 22, 132):
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1. Truth-functional tautologies
2. φ↔ (¬φ φ), ^φ↔ ¬¬φ
3. φ φ
4. φ→ (ψ φ)
5. (φ ¬ψ) ∨ (((φ ∧ ψ)  χ)↔ (φ (ψ→ χ)))
6. (φ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
U1. ^φ→ ^φ
U2. φ→ φ
C. (φ ∧ ψ)→ (φ ψ)
The first and third are self-explanatory; the second effectively defines the usual modalities of ne-
cessity and possibility through the counterfactual conditional. The fourth is version of the truth
of conditional with tautologous consequents, but expanded to include necessary antecedents. The
fifth Lewis (1973, p. 133) apologetically denigrates as “long and obscure,” but it has a natural inter-
pretation as a version of the equivalence of exportation, with the proviso that the exported sentence
ψ is not made false at the closest φ nodes. The sixth ensures that the counterfactual conditional
is also in general a subjunctive conditional: when the conditional and the antecedent are true at a
node, the consequent is also true at that node. The two U axioms are the syntactic expression of
a universal accessibility relation: what’s possible and necessary doesn’t differ from node to node.
These in total form the axioms for VWU. The C axiom, when added to these, yields VCU; it states
that when any two propositions hold at a node, the counterfactual conditional linking them does,
too, which would not be true in general if for one node, another is at least to similar to it as it is to
itself.
5 Minimally Relevant Properties
In the previous Section, I showed how a set of properties whose corresponding valuation spaces
are each equipped with a semi-pseudometric gives rise to a comparative similarity relation on the
models to which they pertain. But how is this set of properties to be determined? Much can be
said, but I shall suggest, roughly, that it is the properties which are relevant to the truth of the
counterfactual being evaluated. How shall I understand relevance? Here I can only give a partial
sketch instead of a complete answer. Not only do I expect that the details may vary significantly
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from theory to theory, but the analysis of relevant properties in each case may be subtle enough
to merit its own treatment. But, vary as they may, these details are all grounded in the details of
the theories from which they arise, not from subjective criteria outside of the theory’s scope. Thus
my goal is to provide some plausibility for the idea that, even without a fully detailed account of
relevance, any such account, once made precise and good, will be apt for providing a contextual
semantics for counterfactual conditionals whose context is definite and does not depend on whim
or fancy. Indeed, the sketch I give will bear on the examples in Section 7.
To set the stage for the issues involved it may be helpful to review briefly how the present
goal differs from related goals in neighboring provinces of philosophical inquiry. In a word, most
of these have focused, at least in part, on syntactic criteria for relevance, while the notion of
relevance to be at hand should be semantic, a feature of the models of a theory, not depending on
any special features of a language in which the theory is formulated. For instance, the long tradition
of relevance logic (Mares, 2014) has focused on describing a concept of relevant implication or
entailment more circumspect than its well-known classical cousin, but its restriction is typically
formulated in terms of the structure of the related sentences.
There is another tradition aimed at understanding the structure of relevance from the vantage
of philosophy of language and metaphysics.10 Some of the programs within this tradition are also
substantially syntactic, needfully so because of their goal to capture aspects of purported hyper-
intension in natural language. They aim to capture how even intensionally equivalent sentences
of a language could be understood as being “about” different subject matters. Following Hawke
(2018), we can distinguish at least three such: the atom-based, subject-predicate, and ways-based
programs. According to the atom-based program, “the subject matter of [a formal sentence] φ can
be identified, in some sense, with the set of atomic claims from which φ is composed” (Hawke,
2018, p. 698), which requires distinguishing the atoms of the language used. By contrast, according
to the subject-predicate program, “the subject matter of φ is the set of objects of which something
is said by stating φ” (Hawke, 2018, p. 698). Although the archetypal version by Perry (1989) has
syntactical elements in its formulation, they are mostly superficial. But the sort of relevance of
present concern isn’t merely having the same subject matter, in the sense of making predications
of the same objects: the properties predicated should be relevant because they potentially make a
difference to the truth value of the counterfactual under examination.
So: how to make sense of the idea that some property’s values potentially make a difference for
another’s? Lewis (1986b) famously suggested a difference-making principle in his account of cau-
sation, the schema for which has expanded to truth-making (Lewis, 2001), explanation (Strevens,
2004, 2008), epistemology (Comesan˜a and Sartorio, 2014), and mechanisms (Glennan, 2017). But
10For a brief history of this tradition, see Osorio-Kupferblum (2016, Sect. 1); for a wealth of references and a slightly
more technical presentation of some representative examples from a particular point of view, see Hawke (2018).
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these principles have themselves have typically (though not universally) contained counterfactual
conditionals—e.g., “We think of a cause as something that makes a difference, and the differ-
ence it makes must be a difference from what would have happened without it” (Lewis, 1986b,
pp. 160–1)—invoking which would only obscure the identification of difference-making proper-
ties.11 But Lewis (1988a,b) also initiated the ways-based program for understanding the structure
of relevance, according to which a subject matter is a just a distinction among different ways the
world could be, and relevance is construed (more or less) as overlapping subject matter. Lewis’s
goal is different from the present one, however, pulling his development away from what is needed
for propositional difference-making. Nevertheless, it is the closest to my present goals among the
available options, so I shall adapt some of its semantic insights, along with some modifications
very loosely inspired from the sophistications in the ways-based program of Yablo (2014).12
First, it will help to introduce some terminology. Any property P applicable to the models W
of a theory comes with a valuation vP : W → V for some valuation space V . For any θ ∈ V , one
can define the level set of vP at θ as L(vP, θ) = {w ∈ W : vP(w) = θ}. The level sets of a valuation
vP partition the models W into classes each of whose elements shares a common value in V . Given
two properties, P and P′, with valuations vP : W → V and vP′ : W → V ′, their values θ ∈ V and
θ′ ∈ V ′ are orthogonal in W when L(vP, θ) ∩ L(vP′ , θ′) , ∅.
A set of properties P is minimally relevant to a property P for models in W when it satisfies
the following two conditions.
Connection For each P′ ∈ P, there is some value θ′ ∈ vP′[W] and some value θ ∈ vP[W] that are
not orthogonal in W.
Quasi-Independence For any P′, P′′ ∈ P, if vP′(w) = θ′ entails that vP′′(w) = θ′′ for all w ∈ W,
then vP′′(w) = θ′′ entails that vP′(w) = θ′ for all w ∈ W and {P′} and {P′′} induce the same
comparative similarity relation on W.
The connection condition ensures that some value of each P′ ∈ P entails the negation of some
value of P. If it entails many such, it can entail some unique value of P. Because of the symmetry
of the definition, this provides that relevant properties P are ones whose values are necessary or
11This is because of the circularity involved in giving an account of the semantics of counterfactual conditions that
invokes the truth of some other counterfactual conditional. Perhaps one could show that this still yielded an implicit
definition of the semantics, but I am skeptical of this strategy’s prospects because one conditional appears in the object
language and another in the metalanguage. Of course, this sort of circularity would not be a problem if one had other
resources to which one could appeal. Indeed, if one were engaged in the project of saving the phenomena of scientific
(or everyday) language use, as Muller (2005) (and Lewis (1973), respectively) is, then one could use basic judgments
of competent language users to determine these counterfactuals.
12The connection is loose because Yablo (2014) introduces syntactic elements (in particular, literals) to avoid prob-
lems that arise when one uses Lewis’s formalism as an account of sentential “aboutness” (Hawke, 2018, §4.3.2),
conflicting with the present goal to give a semantic theory.
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sufficient for some value of P. The quasi-independence condition ensures a sort of minimality:
any property valuations which are not logically independent are equivalent with respect to the
comparative similarity relation they induce.13
For any given property P, in general there will be many sets of properties Pminimally relevant
to it. Some sets will not contain enough properties, while others too much. Say that such a set
P is quasi-maximal if and only if whenever P ⊂ P′ and P′ is minimally relevant to P, P and P′
induce the same comparative similarity relation on W. So, whenever a property can be added to a
quasi-maximal set P of properties while preserving its minimal relevance for P, that addition does
not make a difference for the induced comparative similarity relation.
Finally, we can state the contextual rule for the set of properties needed for determining the
comparative similarity relation:
Context When evaluating the counterfactual conditional φ ψ within a theory with models W,
use the comparative similarity relation induced on W by any quasi-maximal set of properties
minimally relevant for ψ in v−1φ [>] = {w ∈ W : vφ(w) = >}.
Any quasi-maximal set of properties for ψ in v−1φ [>]—the set of models in which φ is true—
determines the same comparative similarity relation on W by definition. These are the properties
of models that are relevant for the truth of ψ among the φ-models.
There is of course a sense in which each of the properties in the quasi-maximal set for the
consequent make a different for the truth of the counterfactual, but this does not mean that each
minimally relevant property is “equally weighted” in any straightforward arithmetic way. (That is,
the comparative similarity relation induced on W may not arise from a single semi-pseudometric
on W that is an arithmetic sum of those induced from the aforementioned properties.) Nevertheless,
there is also a definite sense in which a quasi-maximal set may contain “weighted” properties. For
instance, consider two real-valued properties P1 and P2—viz., vP1 : W → R and vP2 : W → R.14
Then one can define a new property Q with valuation vQ = avP1 + bvP2 , for a, b ∈ R. If a , b, then
Q represents a property that is an “unequally weighted” combination of properties P1 and P2, and
may well appear in a quasi-maximal set.
Regardless of whether the quasi-maximal set for the consequent contains such weighted prop-
erties, the contextual rule here is non-trivially so: it varies in general from counterfactual con-
sequent to consequent. Contra van Fraassen (1980, p. 118), this context is determined by these
semantics given the models of a particular theory. Just as physical theories don’t affirm much
unconditionally—only what’s the case in all their models—but bestow their insight conditioned on
13Orthogonality and connection are concepts from Lewis (1988a), while quasi-independence is inspired from the
definitions of minimal truthmakers and falsemakers from Yablo (2014).
14This of course can be greatly generalized; they need only be valued, for example, in some module, in order to
define the weighted sum.
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“boundary conditions, initial conditions, parameter-values, auxiliary assumptions and what not”
(Muller, 2005, p. 95), they don’t affirm much about relevant similarity unless provided the context
that a particular counterfactual conditional offers. This is the essential point: even if the technical
details I have provided of how the relevant properties should be contextually determined require re-
vision or adaptation to specific cases, the particular counterfactual conditional considered provides
that determination with the resources a physical theory already provides.
6 Comparing Variably Strict Conditionals with Maudlin’s Mod-
est Proposal
Before illustrating the above account with a few examples, I pause for a comparative excursus.
Maudlin (2007) has proposed an account of how to evaluate counterfactuals using physical theo-
ries that has some resemblances and some differences with mine and with that of Lewis (1973),
which he discusses explicitly. After sketching his position I shall briefly compare it with my own,
highlighting some of my account’s potential advantages: greater generality and formal precision.15
Maudlin takes as his starting point not models of theories, but laws, due to their commonly
accepted role in scientific explanation: “scientific and commonsense explanations demand the
postulation of [(fundamental) laws of temporal evolution] and their adjunct principles” (Maudlin,
2007, p. 13) such as boundary conditions, the specification of particular forces, etc. Which tem-
porally extended regularities are laws is not determined by anything else; they are ontologically
primitive, but they themselves determine what’s possible or necessary, to the extent that they do,
according to which states of affairs they permit or require, respectively. Indeed, “The content of
the laws can be expressed without modal notions, and suffices to determine a class of models. The
models can then be treated as ‘possible worlds’ in the usual way, and so provide truth conditions
for claims about nomic possibility and necessity” (Maudlin, 2007, p. 21).
They also provide truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals φ ψ at a spacetime world
w through a three-step evaluation process (Maudlin, 2007, pp. 22–3).
1. Choose a Cauchy surface C for w—a three-dimensional surface in the spacetime through
which each maximal timelike worldine passes completely.
2. Construct a Cauchy surface C′ satisfying φ that is otherwise the same as C, inasmuch as this
is possible according to the laws.
15Maudlin does develop his account for probabilistic theories, whereas I do not in this essay. The points of compar-
ison thus treat non-probabilistic theories.
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3. Apply the laws to C′ to develop a new model spacetime w′, and evaluate whether ψ is true at
w′.
The antecedent φ ideally should pick out both C and C′ uniquely, and if the laws are deterministic
with respect to their initial-value problem, the resulting w′ will be unique as well. If not, then
vagueness or non-determinism will yield through this recipe a collection of spacetime worlds w′.
In any case, φ ψ is true at w if for all such w′, ψ is true at w′.16
How, on Maudlin’s account, does one understand the ceteris paribus clause of step two? “In
each case different cetera are paria, and which change is appropriate is decided, if at all, by context
and background assumptions.” (Maudlin, 2007, p. 24). But in contrast with Lewis (1973, 1986a),
“our recipe makes no reference to an overall similarity between worlds, the nearest thing being
a ceteris paribus condition that determines what counts as the appropriate carrying out of a com-
mand” (Maudlin, 2007, p. 33). This contrast should not be overstated, however. After all, when
there are many way of constructing some C′ that makes φ true that require some other modifications
to w, which does one select? Maudlin does not make precise how this should be done. Regardless
of whether this is a problem for Maudlin’s goals,17 it will not suffice for the present ones, which
include how the semantics for counterfactuals can be provided internally to a scientific theory. By
contrast, the previous Section has outlined how the comparative similarity relation among models
is determined from the properties of the models minimally relevant to the evaluation of a given
counterfactual.
Another difference is the comparatively restricted scope of Maudlin’s account, which applies
only to explicitly spatiotemporal theories (needed for the definition of a Cauchy surface) with a
well-defined initial-value problem (needed in order to apply laws to the Cauchy surface to gener-
ate a model) and counterfactual conditionals whose antecedents specify a Cauchy surface (at least
vaguely). Maudlin (2007, p. 13) does stress that “Some so-called laws of co-existence, such as
the ideal gas law PV = nRT , are better construed as consequences of laws of temporal evolution”
rather than laws. But this seems to be dependent on our evidence for an inter-theoretic reduction
with kinetic theory, not a consequence of the theory itself; indeed, why should it have been impos-
sible for Boyle to reason counterfactually with his law (that for a fixed amount of gas at a constant
temperature PV = const.) 75 years before the development of kinetic theory? Of course, Maudlin
16On Maudlin’s account, this is a material conditional, not a material biconditional, for he adds that φ ψ is false
at w if for all such w′, ψ is false at w′. If ψ is true at some w′ and false at others, φ  ψ is indeterminate. Thus,
Maudlin’s proposal is actually for a three-valued logic. One oddity of this proposal is that it makes φ  ¬ψ and
¬(φ ψ) logically equivalent. For convenience, I will set these differences aside in the remainder.
17Maudlin (2007, p. 33) stresses that “the principal test of a semantic theory is how it accords with our intuitions”
not just in evaluation, but in its justification: “the psychological question of how people evaluate counterfactuals, what
processes underlie their intuitions” (Maudlin, 2007, p. 33). Readers may decide for themselves whether the three-step
process Maudlin presents resembles their cognitive processes in evaluating counterfactuals, as Maudlin asserts it does;
in any case, what is important is that Maudlin’s goals are distinct from the present ones in this essay.
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is ultimately interested in the metaphysics of laws of nature, whereas I am presently interested
in theory-based reasoning regardless of the theory’s metaphysical interpretation or viability. The
metaphysical (im)possibility of the situations described by the models makes no difference in my
account.
Setting these differences in goals aside, there are some special conditions for my own account
under which Maudlin’s falls as a special case. Under the conditions outlined in the previous para-
graph, suppose as well that the theory under consideration is deterministic, in the sense that the
model w′ constructed in stage three of Maudlin’s procedure is unique. For a counterfactual con-
ditional under all these conditions, his account and mine will always agree on the counterfactual’s
truth value at a model, regardless of the comparative similarity relation (modulo the remarks of
footnote 16). This is because if there is a unique model at which one needs to evaluate whether the
conditional’s consequent holds, then the application of the whole apparatus of comparative simi-
larity becomes trivial—it doesn’t matter which models are more comparatively similar to which,
since there is only one model to check.
Under slightly more general conditions, suppose that there is not necessarily such a unique
model, but that the consequent receives the same truth value in each of the models generated. In
this case, too, Maudlin’s account and mine will always agree on the counterfactual’s truth value at a
model, regardless of the comparative similarity relation (again modulo the remarks of footnote 16).
In this case, which includes the previous one as a special case, the comparative similarity relation
doesn’t matter because no matter how that relation selects among the antecedent-satisfying models,
the semantic evaluation of the conditional will always be the same. (Here there is also agreement
with the strict conditional described in Section 2.)
Thus the advantage of introducing this comparative similarity structure, and showing how it is
determined from the theory and the counterfactual under evaluation, arises in more complicated
cases. These include cases falling under the auspices of Maudlin’s account, but for which compar-
ative similarity is needed for the “ceteris paribus” part of his recipe. It also includes cases involving
theories that do not fit the strictures of Maudlin’s account: being spatiotemporal, having Cauchy
surfaces and a well-defined initial-value problem, etc. These will both be illustrated with a few
examples in the sequel, Section 7.
7 Application: Elementary Equilibrium Thermodynamics
Elementary equilibrium thermodynamics is a statical theory: it does not concern in general the de-
tailed changes of thermodynamical quantities over time, only their balance for various equilibrium
states. Thus there is no such thing as an “initial-value problem” in the theory. (The conceit of the
quasi-static process is that the thermodynamical system undergoing it proceeds, in some way or
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other, along a sequence of equilibrium states; the exact dynamics of this process are beyond the
scope of the theory.) And because thermodynamical quantities are not generally spatiotemporal,
the theory does not permit any adjudications of more or less spatially or temporally “widespread”
variability among states of thermodynamic affairs. For these reasons neither Maudlin’s nor Lewis’s
account of the truth conditions for counterfactual conditions readily applies.
But it is simple for the approach am I advancing. Consider systems of enclosed gases in a
piston-cylinder device with pressure P, volume V , and absolute temperature T , each positive real
numbers, models of which will be those described by the combined gas law: for any particular
such gas, PV/T = const. This constant sets which models are accessible from which others.
(In particular, they will divide into equivalence classes based on the value of this constant.) The
device will fail (break) whenever the pressure, volume, or temperature of the gas rises to at least
the thresholds P¯, V¯ , or T¯ , respectively. Consider a particular sample of gas whose pressure is P¯/2,
volume is V¯/2, and temperature is T¯/4: for this sample, the device is not failing.
Consider further the following counterfactual conditionals:
1. If the gas were twice as hot, the device would not fail.
2. If the gas were twice as hot and the piston were fixed, the device would fail.
I interpret the antecedent as (colloquially) referring to the absolute temperature. In both cases,
the property relevant to the consequent of the conditional is the maximum among the values of
the pressure, volume, and temperature. The device fails in a model (which we can represent as
property F) according to the following valuation on models parameterized by (P,V,T ):
vF(P,V,T ) =
> if max{P/P¯,V/V¯ ,T/T¯ } ≥ 1,⊥ if max{P/P¯,V/V¯ ,T/T¯ } < 1. (6)
Since this is a qualitative property, its valuation space acquires the same semi-pseudometric as
described in equation 1. This yields a relatively simple comparative similarity relation: models
are at least as similar as each other at any model just in case they have the same verdict regarding
whether the device fails.
To evaluate the first counterfactual at the model (P¯/2, V¯/2, T¯/4), one must consider the set
of models with temperature T = T¯/2 (that also satisfy the combined gas law). Note that for














2, T¯/2) satisfies the first condition of the truth conditions described at the begin-





2, T¯/2), then vF(P,V, T¯/2) = ⊥. Thus the sentence is true. Intuitively, the models
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for which T = T¯/2 that also satisfy the combined gas law are never more similar regarding the




2, T¯/2), and those equally similar are also ones in which
the device does not fail.
To evaluate the second counterfactual at the model (P¯/2, V¯/2, T¯/4), one must consider the set
of models with volume V = V¯/2 temperature T = T¯/2 (that also satisfy the combined gas law).
It turns out that there is only one such model: (P¯, V¯/2, T¯/4), and vF(P¯, V¯/2, T¯/4) = >. So it then
becomes trivial that the second counterfactual is true, since the only model accessible at which the
antecedent is true is one in which the consequent is also true.
Although these two examples are very simple, they are essentially of the same form as the pair
of counterfactual conditionals that (as described in Section 2) the strict conditional could never
make true at once.18 This shows the semantics I have provided do not ultimately reduce to those
of the strict conditional.
8 Implications: Models, Logics, and Laws
Accounts of the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals concerning physical phenomena
have typically followed one of two paths. The first, most standard one, is to ground the condition-
als’ truth conditions in an account of physical laws of nature. This is Lewis’s approach, with its
sophisticated formal machinery of comparative similarity relations on possible worlds but also its
essential reliance on miracles in the determination of comparative similarity among worlds. The
second path is to deny that physical theories ground the conditionals’ truth conditions at all. This
is van Fraassen’s approach, which, while avoiding the problems with Lewis’s, is a Pyrrhic victory
for understanding how scientific theories can ground counterfactual reasoning. I have in this essay
marked the trailhead, first imagined by Muller (2005), for a third path, that advances a semantics of
comparative similarity among models of a theory whose contextuality is determined by the theory.
In the remainder, I’d like to draw out the implications of following this path for the philosophy of
other particular sciences, the logics of counterfactuals and relevance, and laws of nature.
First, although I have been using examples from physics to illustrate a path to formalized coun-
terfactual reasoning, nothing on this path essentially demands that this reasoning concern physical
phenomena described by a physical theory. In the first place, the only role of theory in the account
is to provide a class of models of possible ways the phenomena they represent could be. There
is no loss if the models do not arise from a theory, but instead from some endogenous modeling
practices. Moreover, that the models are of physical phenomena is not essential. Any sufficiently
18As Jaramillo and Lam (2018) document, for theories like general relativity, evaluating counterfactual conditionals
is computationally intensive, even without spacetime curvature’s interaction with matter. Despite their claims to the
contrary, however, these problems are entirely practical; in principle the same approach developed here applies to
general relativity, too.
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formalized models, of whatever sort of phenomena they represent—physical, biological, social,
etc.—can be the basis for counterfactual reasoning. Rather, the brambles to be cleared are those
obscuring how to extend the approach from non-probabilistic to probabilistic models.
Second, certain aspects of the presented logic for counterfactual conditionals deserve further
development. At a broad level, its advancement comes through the application of relevance con-
cepts to these conditionals. The mixture of these two is not new: it is not always appreciated that C.
I. Lewis devised the strict conditional not as a theory of counterfactuals but to advance a relevance
logic for conditionals (Garson, 2016, §5), and others have developed more sophisticated theories
of counterfactual conditionals as relevant conditionals (Mares and Fuhrmann, 1995; Mares, 2004).
What is the connection between these latter systems and the present one?
At a narrower level, there is a slightly subtle tension between Lewis’s semantics for VWU (or
VCU) and my own. These V-logics assume a single comparative similarity relation on the nodes,
while my own contextual semantics allows that structure to change depending on the propositions
linked by the counterfactual connective. So, if these propositions do not themselves contain a
counterfactual conditional, then only one similarity structure is used to evaluate the conditional
at a node, hence my semantics matches with Lewis’s. The converse will hold when any nested
counterfactuals are trivial, or induce the same comparative similarity relation, but otherwise this is
not guaranteed. How this affects the proof theory of the logic, and its consequent differences with
VWU (and VCU), are yet to be explored.
Third, one of the central objections to antirealism about laws of nature is that these laws seem
to be central to scientific practices of reasoning counterfactually and causally. By contrast, the
account of counterfactual reasoning presented notably contains no reference to laws of nature, ob-
viating the first version of this objection. The development of a suitable counterfactual account of
causality therefrom would then obviate the second. To accommodate laws’ common invocation
in scientific reasoning, I would prefer a deflationary account of them rather than an error theory.
On such an account, I would agree with van Fraassen (1989, p. 224) that “Apparent laws which
frequently appear are often partial descriptions of special subclasses of models,” and that the par-
ticular axiomatizations of theories through these apparent laws summarize “important features by
which models may be described and classified. The distinction between these features and oth-
ers that characterize the model equally well is in the eye of the theoretician; it does not, to my
mind, correspond to any division in nature” (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 223). Or, rather, it need not
so correspond—see further the discussion in Fletcher (2019, §6.2). Further development of this
deflationary account of laws of nature, and its concomitant elaboration of causality, deserving as
they are, must await another occasion.
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